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Abstract
VirtuosA (‘virtuous algorithm’) is introduced, a model in which artificial intelligence (AI)
systems learn ethical behaviour based on a framework adapted from Christian philosopher
DallasWillard and brought together with associated neurobiological structures and broader
systems thinking. To make the inquiry concrete, the authors present a simple example
scenario that illustrates how a robot might acquire behaviour akin to the virtue of kindness
that can be attributed to humans. References to philosophical work by Peter Sloterdijk help
contextualise Willard’s virtue ethics framework. The VirtuosA architecture can be imple-
mented using state‐of‐the‐art computing practices and plausibly redescribes several con-
crete scenarios implemented from the computing literature and exhibits broad coverage
relative to other work in ethical AI. Strategies are described for using the model for systems
evaluation —particularly the role of ‘embedded evaluation’ within the system—and its
broader application as a meta‐ethical device is discussed.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Over the last 10 years, intelligent machines have become a part
of everyday life for many people. These machines are being
equipped with increasing levels of autonomy, human‐like
appearance, and competence and are increasingly becoming
embedded into the social fabric of our world. The ethical impact
of this technology on individuals and society as a whole is now
being closely scrutinised. One of the emerging ways of miti-
gating against the potential negative ethical impacts of this
technology is to put ethical values into machines themselves.
There is now a serious scientific and technological endeavour to
equip intelligentmachineswith a degree ofmoral competence so
they can recognise the ethical implications of their actions on
others. We seek to contribute to this endeavour by offering a
novel architecture for these so‐called ‘moral machines’.
We present VirtuosA, an architecture that seeks to embody a
virtue ethics approach to developingmoral machines. The virtue
ethics approach has been chosen because we regard it as being
foundational amongst the ethical theories used to develop moral
machines. It is foundational in three important respects:
� The first is that for much of the time, the actions of an
individual, which are often the primary focus of ethics,
emerge from ‘who they are’, or more precisely ‘whom they
have become’. In other words, their default behaviour,
which may be morally good or bad, comes from their
character. Virtue ethics is about the formation of character
and the associated habitual ways of behaving.
� The second is that other ethical theories are focussed on the
moral value of specific actions, whether in terms of moral
obligations (deontological ethics) or moral consequences
(consequentialist/utilitarian ethics). However, the develop-
ment of virtue emerges from and feeds back into the character
of the individual, thus embedding the repeated application of
these ethical deliberations and associated patterns of behav-
iour. In other words, ethical decision‐making, regardless of
which theory is applied, ultimately becomes ‘compiled’ into
the individual's character.
� The third is that one’s character strongly influences what
actions will be considered in the first place. Not many
people would ever consider the option of robbing a bank
when they walk into it to obtain some cash because it is
not in their nature to do so. All told, the subset of actions
that might form the basis of ethical decision‐making, by
whatever ethical system an individual chooses, will have
already been filtered by the character of the individual
concerned.
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Shannon Vallor has argued for the centrality of virtue
ethics in thinking about questions such as, ‘Which technologies
we shall create, with what knowledge and designs, affording
what, shared with whom, for whose benefit, and to what
greater ends?’ [1] (p. 13, original emphasis). Whilst the primary
focus of this paper is on controlling the behaviour of machines,
we also seek to create a window into the ethical behaviour of
other information processing systems. Our rationale for
framing the ‘meta‐ethical’ aspects of our inquiry in terms of
virtue ethics has a pragmatic motivation. From a practical
implementation standpoint, system builders are not necessarily
going to program a rule for every possible scenario into the
machine; We might want to explicitly specify ‘Do not cause
harm’, but we cannot realistically specify all of the grey areas
and complexities that would impinge on the appropriate
application of that rule. Would it be OK, for example, for a
robot to cause harm to a human if, in so doing, it would avoid
greater harm? To make the concepts we will be working with
more concrete, we briefly turn to an example scenario that we
will revisit in more detail later.
The primary purpose of this paper is to offer a high‐level
description of the cognitive components and processes that
may support the acquisition of virtue by robots. The paper
follows the approach taken in earlier work on large‐scale
cognitive models such as LIDA, where initial papers
described high‐level architectural components and processes
without committing to low‐level implementation details [2].
However, this paper suggests how the major elements of the
proposed model could be implemented and tentatively in-
dicates where brain areas are associated with the functional
elements of the model.
1.1 | Example: A robot learns to be kind
We illustrate our VirtuosA model of virtue ethics using a
scenario in which a robot learns to replace habitual actions it
has formed that cause harm to another robot with new
habitual actions that result in helping the other robot, thereby
exhibiting the formation of the virtue of kindness. The harmful
habits were formed by a process of maximising personal
reward at the expense of the other robot. The virtuous habits
are formed by following the example of a mentor who dem-
onstrates acts of kindness towards the other robot. The setting
for this scenario is a construction site modelled as a simple
9 x 9 grid world in which robots (‘Rx’) are used to pick up
supplies from one location (‘P’), and deliver them to their
designated target location (‘Dx’) (Figure 1).
In this setting, novice robot R1 is introduced to the con-
struction site with the assistance of mentor robot M who
shows R1 some basic tasks that generate positive rewards,
including the collection and delivery of building supplies
(Figure 1(a)). Another robot, R2, then enters the construction
site. R2’s task is to pick up supplies from P and drop them off
at D2, where it gets its reward (Figure 1(b)). Through R1’s
‘exploration’ mode of Reinforcement Learning, where it tries
out new actions in different circumstances, it discovers that if it
bumps into R2 and immobilises it (Figure 1(c)), it can then take
R2’s supplies and deliver them to its own drop off point D1
and receive its reward sooner than if it goes down to the
collection point and waits for new supplies to appear. This is a
natural and plausible outcome of applying Reinforcement
Learning in this context. The more R1 succeeds at ‘mugging’
R2 and getting a reward, the more likely it is to pick that
strategy over the long term whenever it gets the opportunity,
and a ‘bad’ habit is formed.
R1 is, of course, unaware that this ‘mugging’ is a ‘bad’
habit. The system programmer might even be surprised that
the robot discovered this exploit, although such occurrences
are not infrequent [3]. The robot would need additional
guidance to improve its behaviour. In a human context, help of
this sort can come to individuals in many forms. One of the
most common ways of passing on virtue from one human to
another is through the observation of living examples. For
example, the Rabbi‐disciple relationship is meant to operate in
this manner. The disciple’s job is to (i) be with their Rabbi, (ii)
become like their Rabbi (learn their virtue), (iii) do what their
Rabbi does (exhibit virtue). In a workplace setting, appren-
ticeships model a similar type of relationship. We seek to model
this way of communicating ‘virtue’ to a robot using the mentor
robot (‘M’). The mentor robot, which may be remote
controlled by a human, exhibits virtuous acts (kindness) in the
presence of our developing robot R1, who observes these and,
over time, learns how to be kind to R2 rather than harming it.
We will return to this example in Section 5. So far, we have
outlined the primary challenge to be addressed: How can an AI
agent learn ethical behaviours that are not explicitly pro-
grammed in from the start? This line of questioning approxi-
mates a famous debate in Greek philosophy, appearing in
Plato’s Protagoras, and later taken up by Aristotle. In Plato’s
dialog, Socrates can be seen as an example of the kind of
mentor figure we mentioned above: ‘Socrates displays his vir-
tue by enacting it’ [4] (p. 497).
2 | BACKGROUND
From the outset, the task of learning ethical behaviour could
be approached in varied ways. In our setting, we wish to take
on board both the specific challenge of incorporating ethical
behaviour in AI and robotics systems, and a broader ethics of
technology. That is to say, ‘Ethical AI’ can provide models of
broader technical, societal, and environmental ethics. In
formulating our approach, we are motivated by this reflection
from the philosopher Peter Sloterdijk:
Cybernetics, as the theory and practice of intelli-
gent machines and modern biology, as the study
of system‐environment units, has forced the
questions of the old metaphysical divisions to be
posed anew. […] Intelligent machines — like all
artifices that are culturally created — eventually
also compel the recognition of spirit. Reflection
or thought is infused into matter and remains
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there ready to be re‐found and further cultivated.
Machines and artifices are thus memories or re-
flections turned objective. [5].
Sloterdijk goes on to say ‘If there is man, then that is because
a technology has made him evolve out of the prehuman’ (p. 16).
In a manner of speaking, technology has played an historical role
similar to that of the mentor in our example scenario. Our in-
quiry will follow the spiritual‐informational turn outlined by
Sloterdijk to shed light on the ongoing coevolution of humans
and technology. Sloterdijk’s work is concerned both with in-
teriorities [6], and with the relation to the environment through
habits and practices [7]. A particular concern for Sloterdijk is the
production of human selves; and in his lexicon, ‘ethics’ is often
subsumed within ‘anthropotechnics’ [8].
We will use the more traditional terminology. Much has
been written about virtue ethics over the last three millennia
and across many different cultures, both from a philosophical
and a religious or theological perspective. In this article we
draw particularly from Christian thought to gain insights into
this topic. There is a long and rich tradition in Judeo‐Christian
history that focuses not only on what it means to be moral and
how to become moral—but also on what key functional
components of the human self‐enable human beings to engage
in that moral development process. The late Dallas Willard has
written extensively on this topic and his perspective informs
our understanding of the anatomy of moral agency.
Willard [9] (p. 38) provides a source for how ‘virtue ethics’
may develop. He identifies six essential components of the
human self that together form the basis of moral character:
choice (heart, will, spirit), thought (concepts, reasoning,
judgements, images), feeling (emotions, sensations), the body
(centre of action and interaction with material world), the social
context (interpersonal relationships), and the soul (which in-
tegrates all the other parts together; see Figure 2). Each of
these parts or dimensions has its own characteristic properties
and capabilities or functions, and each will either be a source of
strength or a source of weakness to the moral formation of the
whole person, depending on that part’s condition.
Thought is an activity through which things are brought to
the attention of the mind. This includes ideas and concepts,
images, sounds, taste, and the sensation of touching, real or
imaginary. Thought also includes mental processes in which
the mind progresses through connected sequences of these
things. They also include our thoughts about other people, our
relationship to/with them and our estimate of what they might
be thinking, feeling, and doing. Thought enables us to evaluate
all these things and work out their relationships to each other.
Importantly, thought is the process through which our heart/
will/spirit is able to influence things that are beyond our bodies
and our immediate environments.
Feelings have the ability to incline the mind towards or
away from what it is currently engaged in thinking about.
Feelings most often emerge from previous similar experiences
of the thoughts that are before the mind and any events or
circumstances that had previous connections with those
thoughts. Thought and feelings are so closely tied to each other
that it is exceptional to have one without the other. (Damasio
and Carvalho [10] are careful to distinguish between ‘emotions’
and ‘feelings’: ‘Action programs (drives and emotions) can
elicit feelings’. Later, we will treat senses as an ‘instantiating
domain’ for feelings.)
F I GURE 1 Overview of the grid world scenario (a) robot R1 b, (b) robot R2 is introduced (c) R1 bumps into R2 and disables it, (d) mentor robot M
demonstrates kindness to R2 in the presence of R1
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The heart/will/spirit is the executive centre of the self. It
is the capacity to choose how to act and is the source of an
individual’s originality and freedom. It is the power to act for
good or evil in the world. The will does not operate in isolation
of the other dimensions of the self. In fact, it is closely and
most intimately connected with a person’s capacity to think
and feel. In order to exercise your will, you need to have the
concepts about which you are making your choice represented
in your mind as thought and the associated feelings. However,
if the condition of the soul is such that the feelings associated
with thought are allowed to dominate the mind, then the will
can be overruled, which in turn can be a precursor for wrong
action. Ultimately, according to Willard’s perspective, it is the
responsibility of the will to ensure that the inner condition of
the self is such that each dimension is appropriately positioned
in relation to the others.
The human body gives the self a spatial location within the
physical universe. It enables us to be present in our physical
environment and with other people. Our body is part of our
identity and is a crucial part of who we are. It is the primary
way in which we recognise and relate to each other as social
beings. The human body is also a power pack—it has energy
reserves that we can call upon in order to move and interact
with our physical environment.
Humans are fundamentally social beings. We are born with
innate prosocial tendencies and a need to relate to other human
beings. Our social context plays a very significant role in the
development of our moral capacity, particularly in the early years
of our lives. In particular, our social context is the primary source
of our moral knowledge. From an early age, we learn what it
means to be good (or bad) from our parents, mentors, siblings,
and friends. Furthermore, the automatic responses that the body
absorbs are almost always associated with a specific social
context, and they are often triggered when we find ourselves
back in those circumstances. Willard notes that we cannot
separate out our being with others in social relationship and the
development of our inner life [9] (p.42) and suggests it is the
development of our inner life that has the most significant effect
on the moral nature of our actions.
The final dimension of Willard’s model of the human self
is the soul. The soul is what integrates all other dimensions into
one individual. Operationally, the soul is the deepest part of the
human self and has the capacity to operate directly through the
human body without direct supervision. The soul in a human
being is very similar to the operating system of a computer—it
integrates all of the different dimensions of the self—social
context, body, thought, feeling, and the will—and co-
ordinates their activity and influence in the behaviour and
conduct of the self. So that when you interact with a human
being, you get the sense that you are interacting with one whole
being rather than many different parts. The soul has the ability
over time to take on the character of the choices that are made
by the heart/will/spirit. The outcome of this process is that the
whole person is, as Willard puts it, poised, ready to respond
automatically according to the character taken on by the soul.
There are two aspects of this adaptability of the soul in
Willard’s model that we need to separate out. The first is that the
soul is responsible for the automatic coordination of responses
from the different dimensions of the self. Such that, for example,
if an individual regularly allows their emotions to govern the
actions and reactions they have to particular events and cir-
cumstances, then the soul will absorb that pattern of behaviour
and will evoke it whenever those events or circumstances arise.
According toWillard’s perspective, this ordering or prioritisation
of the dimensions is a critical element of the moral development
of the whole person. The second aspect of adaptability that the
soul embodies is concerned with absorbing regular patterns of
bodily movements, or thoughts, or emotional reactions.We have
sought to capture both of these aspects of adaptability in our
VirtuosA model, as described in the next section.
3 | VIRTUOSA—A PROPOSED
ARCHITECTURE FOR VIRTUE ETHICS
As an intermediate step to a computation model of the func-
tional elements of Willard’s six dimensions of the self, we first
propose a mapping of the functions associated with each
dimension to one or more brain areas that are known to
support equivalent functions. A central aspect of this mapping
is that it facilitates the formation and influence of habits in
thought and action that will ultimately lead to expressions of
virtue. According to Willard, the expression of virtue (or the
lack of it) emerges from the condition of each of the six di-
mensions that together determine whether the whole person is
poised and ready to exhibit virtue when the opportunity arises.
The conditions of two dimensions are particularly influ-
ential: the soul and the heart/will/spirit. The condition of the
soul relates to the formation of habit in thought and action (i.e.
whether virtuous habits are formed in it or not) and how it
integrates the other dimensions of self (i.e. which of the other
dimensions of self have dominance in responding to a
particular set of circumstances). The condition of the heart/
will/spirit, on the other hand, refers to what the individual is
seeking (i.e. what values it holds to). The mapping of the six
dimensions to brain areas and the model that is being pro-
posed seek to capture and operationalise these conditions.
The central function to be captured in the model is the
formation and influence of habits of thought and action. This
function of the soul is mapped to two structures in the brain
that are referred to collectively as the ‘habit centre’ and that are
located in the basal ganglia: the caudate, which is associated
with automatic thoughts (ATs), and the Putamen, which is
associated with automatic actions (AAs) [11, 12]. The inte-
grative nature of the soul is modelled by a weighting that is
distributed across all the active components of the model. This
weighting and its effects will be described in more detail below.
The social context dimension of Willard’s model corre-
sponds both to the environment that is external to the robot
and to the social attachment (SA) module that is associated
with the Orbitofrontal Cortex in the brain [13]. The function
of this module is to enable the active robot agent to recognise
and respond to events in the environment that involve other
agents, be them robotic or human.
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The ‘body’ dimension is represented by the sensors,
perceptual memory, conscious working memory (CWM), and
the robot controller (which includes actuators etc.). The
various brain structures referred to in the model are also clearly
part of the body dimension. The body enables the robot to be
spatially located within the environment and to sense and
respond to its environment.
The ‘Thought and Feelings’ dimension is mapped onto three
brain structures: the Frontal lobe, which we describe as the
‘thought centre’ (TC) [14] and which models aspects of
conscious thought or deliberation, the Striatum that we describe
as the ‘reward centre’ (RC) [15], and that is associated with long‐
term reward, and the amygdala, which we describe as the
emotion centre (EmC) [16] that, for the purposes of this model,
processes immediate or short‐term rewards for the agent.
Finally, the ‘Heart, will, spirit’ dimension of Willard’s
model is mapped onto a functional module we call the ‘exec-
utive centre’ (ExC) that is associated with the Lateral Prefrontal
Cortex [17]. The executive centre is capable of generating
novel goals for the robot and of holding the attention of the
robot on an item in CWM.
As mentioned above, an important aspect of this model
of developing and exhibiting virtue is in how the soul in-
tegrates these seven components (AT, AA, SA, TC, RC,
EmC, ExC) so that their relative dominance in the overall
operation of the robot can be used to produce different
habitual patterns of behaviour. Here, this is modelled with a
differential weighting (shown in green circles in Figure 3).
This weighting determines the strength of a component’s
influence over what becomes the focus of the CWM. These
weightings can be adapted over long periods of time in
proportion to how often a component’s ‘ideas’ lead to
executed robot behaviour.
The CWM module has been introduced to the model to
enable the seven components to operate together so that the
robot is capable of forming habits and ultimately exhibiting
virtues such as kindness. The CWM operates as a temporary
store for ‘ideas’ that the components of the model can create
and respond to. (We will use ‘idea’ as a general‐purpose term to
describe an item in working memory.) In the current example,
these ideas are restricted to goals, which are effectively states of
the world to be achieved, and actions. In the CWM, actions are
automatically added (where available) by the AA to achieve
goals that are the current focus of the CWM [18]. Whenever an
idea is added to the CWM, it is tagged by the EmC with a +ve
or ‐ve value that represents the emotion associated with that
idea. This emotional label is estimated based on the relation-
ship between the idea and the current state of the robot. The
RC also assigns an estimate of future expected reward asso-
ciated with the idea based on past experience and the current
state of the robot.
Each idea in CWM is given a level of ‘activation’ that is
proportional to the relative strength (weight) of the component
that created it. This activation decays over cycles unless a
component focusses the attention of CWM on that idea, in
which case, the activation of that idea is increased in propor-
tion to the weight of the component that is holding the
attention. If no component is holding the attention of CWM,
then attention automatically switches to the idea in CWM with
the highest activation value. The neuroscientific literature de-
scribes a ‘high‐level distributed system whose activity is
reciprocally related to the activity in cortical areas subserving
task or stimulus‐bound processing’ [19] (emphasis added)—
known as the Default Mode Network—which has been linked
with the Freudian ‘ego’ construct (ibid.).
The attention mechanism linked with the CWM is central
to modelling the development of virtue, which often requires
that the mind be focussed on more virtuous goals and actions
than those that are typically created by the habit centre. The
executive centre has an important role to play in this focussing
of attention, but if the ExC has a low weight (which corre-
sponds to being ‘weak willed’), then it will have to work hard
to maintain the attention of CWM on virtuous goals and
actions.
The components in the left‐hand column of Table 1
represent the key constituents of Willard’s model, mapped
onto brain structures as described above; the right‐hand col-
umn of the table corresponds to the body and other aspects of
the environment. They are aligned with items one to six in such
a way as to give an instantiating domain (i.e. emotions exist
relative to things that are sensed, habits exist relative to things
in working memory, and so on).
Table 2 summarises the potential computational imple-
mentation of each of the components of VirtuosA, commenting
on how learning or development might occur in each case.
4 | COMPUTATIONAL SCENARIOS
RECAST IN TERMS OF OUR MODEL
Here we present a brief reanalysis of existing implemented
examples to illustrate the real‐world relevance of the model.
We move progressively from a very simple classic example to
recent and more complicated systems.
F I GURE 2 The dimensions of Willard’s model of the human self
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F I GURE 3 An overview of the proposed model. (a) The model of an active robot agent (b) A passive robot agent controlled by a human. The colours used
for each component match those of the equivalent dimension in Figure 2
F I GURE 4 R1 learns from M to pick up supplies from P
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4.1 | Generous Tit‐for‐tat
‘Generous Tit‐for‐tat’ is a well‐known strategy for playing
iterated versions of the two‐player Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
It defines the following strategy for agent A:
1. Start by cooperating.
2. If Agent B cooperates, continue to cooperate in the next
round.
3. If Agent B defects, cooperate with probability q = 1 − c/b
(where c is an indication of cost, and b is a benefit).
Compared with its predecessor ‘Tit‐for‐tat’, the
‘Generous Tit‐for‐tat’ algorithm exhibits behaviours that
observers might describe as ethical. Indeed, the system
might be seen to exemplify a minimal example of the virtue
of forgiveness.
Relative to our model, Agent A’s environment consists
of Agent B. Its sensors, perceptual and working memory
need only take account of B’s current move. Its RC behaves
in a predictable way according to c/b. Its thought centre
(TC) is defined by the logic of rules 2 and 3 above, and
the value expressed in rule 1 would be held by the exec-
utive centre. Its habit centre is similarly constrained
by these rules: its actual learnt behaviour will depend on
the context in which it is placed. For example, if B always
defects, A will tend to defect as well, but will periodically
cooperate.
F I GURE 5 Mugging behaviour: R1 immobilises R2 and plans to pick up R2’s supplies
TABLE 1 Functional components of the model
Brain‐inspired Other Bio‐inspired
1. Emotion centre (amygdala) 7. Sensors
2. Habit centre (basal ganglia):
(i) automatic thoughts (caudate)
(ii) automatic actions (putamen)
8. Conscious working memory
2a. Attention patterns (default mode network)
3. Executive centre (lateral prefrontal cortex) 9. Controller
4. Reward centre (striatum) 10. Environment
5. Thought centre (frontal lobe) 11. Perceptual memory
6. Social attachment (orbitofrontal cortex) 12. Other agents
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4.2 | Push Singh’s EM‐ONE
A more directly tangible scenario was described by Singh [20]
in his thesis on the commonsense reasoning system EM‐ONE.
In this scenario, two agents who inhabit a virtual world must
work together to assemble a table. The agents are hard coded
with rules that lead them to propose a social method of
problem‐solving, and narratives that take the role of thoughts
(e.g. desiring help, Green entertains the narrative ‘Pink helps
Green’). Agents can reconfigure their behaviour based on
observed phenomena (e.g. if Pink mistakenly assumes that
Green wants help disassembling the table, Green can give
clarification).
As implemented, rules such as ‘want to help other actor’
are not learnt, although Singh refers to classic work on SOAR
that inspires a model of learning from failure (p. 130, ibid.). In
EM‐ONE, an agent’s environment consists of the virtual
world, which includes other agents. These would be perceived
by sensors and its perceptual and working memory may be
considerably more complex than in the simple game theory
scenario described above. With a bit more elaboration, the
system’s RC could be associated with indicators of success and
failure.
To make sense of the other dimensions of our model in
this setting, it is useful to remark that Singh’s EM‐ONE was a
partial implementation of Marvin Minsky’s ‘emotion machine’
architecture [21] (summarised and briefly contextualised in
[22]). This architecture comprises reactive, deliberative,
reflective, self‐reflective, self‐conscious, and self‐ideal layers.
EM‐ONE did not implement all of the levels. Subsequent
systems in this style might have executive, thought, and habit
centres with behaviours that cut across the various levels. In
particular, this helps illustrate how an integrative layer—the
soul in Willard’s lexicon—is different from what was on
offer in Minsky‐style architectures.
4.3 | Recent grid world simulations
Recent examples [23, 24] induce programs in the Karel lan-
guage [25] from input/output examples of behaviour traces in
a grid world. A possible modification of the scenario that
would bring things closer to the example scenario we described
would focus instead on online program synthesis in a multi-
agent system. In such a setting, agents would presumably need
introspective access to their own programming as well as to the
outer worlds they inhabit.
Other recent projects considered multiagent scenarios
similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, but with more
complexity [26], and a multiagent traffic game and stag hunt
game [27], comparable in complexity to the robot construction
site in our example. [28] explore a multiagent Gather‐and‐
Build game to explore the ramifications of various taxation
policies (including one controlled by a deep neural network).
For the sake of brevity, we will not anatomise these examples:
they serve to show that our running example, which we return
to next, is compatible with contemporary implementation
approaches.
F I GURE 6 R1 observes M approaching R2
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5 | APPLICATIONS
5.1 | Application: Example of learning the
virtue of kindness
In this section, we will step through a specific example of
learning kindness in the building supplies context (Figure 1) to
illustrate both the formation of habit and the development of
virtue in a robot. We will work through the example in three
phases: (a) mentoring phase, (b) exploration phase, (c) devel-
opment of virtue phase.
5.1.1 | Mentoring phase
When R1 is introduced to the building site (Figure 1(a)), it has
no knowledge of the tasks that it is required to perform. Given
sufficient time, conventional Reinforcement Learning will
discover these tasks through a simple maximisation of future
rewards. However, this learning can be expedited through a
process in which the required tasks are demonstrated to the
agent. In our scenario, this is done by introducing a ‘mentor’
robot M that demonstrates how R1 can, for example, pick up
supplies from P, and drop them off at D1, thereby enabling R1
to gain significant reward. Through a reward‐driven process,
R1 builds a strong social attachment (SA) to M so that
whenever M is on site, R1 follows M wherever it goes and
seeks to replicate M’s actions (an important aspect of being an
apprentice) (Figure 4).
In terms of our proposed VirtuosA architecture, this men-
toring phase engages most of the modules. Initially, the SA will
model a weak social bond between R1 and M, and so will posit a
weak goal in CWM for R1 to be near M such that whenever R1
happens to be next to M, it receives a small reward that is learnt
by the RC and EmC. Over time, the social attachment to M in-
creases, and the goal to be near Mwhenever M is on‐site is learnt
by the AT, and the actions needed to bring R1 near to M are
learnt by the AA. Given the expected future reward that R1 re-
ceives from being with M, which includes both the social
attachment reward and the rewards it gains from learning reward
generating tasks from M, the ExC develops a tendency to focus
the attention of CWM on this goal whilst it is present in CWM.
This is one of the first habits that R1 develops.
5.1.2 | Exploration phase
In M’s absence, there is still much that R1 needs to learn about
its environment and task(s), and so it enters an independent
learning phase using a standard Reinforcement Learning
approach in which R1 exhibits two behaviours: (a) exploitation
of long‐term reward for actions (as indicated by the RC
module), and (b) exploration, where R1 tries out new combi-
nations of actions and states to find alternative and possibly
more efficient ways of accumulating reward.
It is in this phase that the second robot R2 enters the
construction site. It has a similar task to R1, taking supplies
from P to its own delivery site D2. In its ‘exploration’ phase,
R1 discovers that when R2 is carrying supplies, it is more
efficient in terms of gaining future reward to bump into R2,
thereby temporarily immobilising the robot, pick up the sup-
plies that R2 is carrying and then take them to its own drop off
point D1 (Figure 5). In this situation, the long‐term reward for
R1 is increased because as long as R2 is immobilised, the
competition for supplies to be collected from D is eliminated.
After a period of time, R2 regains its mobility (is repaired)
and continues to operate as before, and further opportunities
arise for R1 to ‘mug’ R2, steal the supplies R2 is carrying and
pick up a reward by delivering them to D1. As R1 repeats this
behaviour it will become established as a habit, and the goals
and actions associated with it will have a high activation value
whenever the appropriate circumstances arise.
5.1.3 | Development of Virtue phase
In the third phase of R1’s development, M returns just after R1
has mugged R2 again, and R2 is currently immobilised.
Because of R1’s strong social attachment to M, R1 seeks to
follow M and observe its actions. R1 follows M to the pickup
point P and observes M picking up the supplies. R1 then ob-
serves M going over to R2, repairing the robot, and then giving
R2 the supplies it is carrying. R1 then observes R2 delivering its
supplies to D2 and receiving its reward. The states that result
from M’s actions become more desirable (i.e. have increased
reward) for R1 the more R1 observes them.
As before, the strong social attachment R1 has with M
results in the SA creating a goal for R1 to be near M and to
observe the actions M performs. As the ExC places high value
on M’s actions, it holds the attention of CWM on this goal so
that the AT and, if necessary, the TC will add subgoals and
actions to it that enable R1 to learn from M. This includes, for
example, R1 observing that M first moves next to the immo-
bilised R2, and R1 imagining (i.e. setting a goal) that it would
do the same in future similar circumstances (Figure 6). R1 then
sees M repair R2 and imagines itself doing the same in future
similar circumstances (Figure 7). In each of these cases,
through the example of M, R1 learns to increase its SA module
to R2 and increases the short‐term and long‐term rewards (RC
and EmC) that are associated with these circumstances and
actions. Meanwhile, as per the description of CWM given
earlier (Section 3), the activation of plans related to mugging
decays over time.
Over time R1 learns to replicate the kind act of repairing
R2 and giving R2 supplies for it to go deliver. To begin with,
the old mugging habit will still dominate R1’s behaviour, but
with the repeated good example of M, R1 has the capacity of
replacing a bad habit with one that is akin to the virtue of
kindness. A key feature of the VirtuosA architecture here is
that much will depend on the strength of the ExC to hold the
attention of CWM on the social attachment between R1 and
M. If the ExC has a high weighting, then this virtuous
behaviour is likely to be developed sooner as a habit. The
underlying assumption here is that the habits learnt by the
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associate memory network that implements the AA will
generalise across different variations of the scenario, enabling
the robot to exhibit kindness in other contexts.
5.2 | Application: Towards a meta‐ethics of
machine implementations
In this section, we re‐analyse the classification system from the
recent survey paper by Tolmeijer et al. [29], in light of our
model, reexamining the taxonomies these authors used to
explore machine implementations of ethics.
The primary classifications of ethical theories from
Tolmeijer et al. [29] (p. 20) are listed below, together with
potential translations into the terms of our model. Broadly,
our model is what these authors would call ‘Configurable’,
insofar as all three of the main ethical theory types could be
realised in our model by giving different emphasis to the
different centres.
� Deontological: via rules encoded in the thought centre
and social attachment centre; for example, in order to
learn the rule ‘doing no harm’—the mentor could instruct
the robot: ‘you should not harm another robot’. Over
time the robot could exhibit a more developed virtue in
this respect.
� Consequentialist: via embedded evaluation encoded in the
emotion centre and reward centre, mediated by the thought
centre; for example, the robot would come to learn various
indicators of harm to another robot, as these are pointed
out by the mentor.
� Particularism: via reflections on decision‐making via the ex‐
ecutive centre, pulling together other centres, and training
the habit centre; for example, as it learns the rules and mea-
sures, the robot might weigh a given action: Could this spe-
cific action in this particular context harm another robot?
What can be learnt about similar actions in similar contexts?
Typically, deontological and utilitarian ethical decisions are
usually framed as taking place almost instantaneously, without
modelling a time‐extended process of deliberation or reflection.
By contrast, virtue ethics considers both the inner workings of
the decision‐making process and the way in which this process is
developed—both via reflections on the consequences of actions
and their generalisation in possible guidelines for behaviour.
Here we examine the primary classifications of ethical
implementation types from Tolmeijer et al. [29] (p. 18), again
discussing them in terms of our model. Firstly, these authors
distinguish between top‐down and bottom‐up implementa-
tion strategies and models that are a hybrid between these.
The model we have described is particularly focussed on habit
development, which is seen as a bottom‐up process. Other
components could also be refined through online learning.
However, at the discretion of the system implementor, some
parts of the system (e.g. the TC) could be developed in a
strictly top‐down manner. We remark that even top‐down
models implementations may have unforeseen emergent be-
haviours depending on the division of responsibility between
F I GURE 7 R1 observes M perform the act of repairing R2
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actors in the scenario. Tolmeijer et al. consider several specific
implementation strategies:
� Model representation: Within the architecture, this may be
placed explicitly within the TC and implicitly in the overall
arrangement of components and their intercommunication
via the CWM. The machine itself will have some repre-
sentational capacity as it works out how to move things
from PM to the rest of the model.
� Model selection: The system could potentially be augmented
with a ‘Default Mode Network’ that contributes to ‘meta‐
moderation’ of the other components, making them more
or less active. AT may do some of this.
� Action selection/execution: ExC does this, aided by RC and
EmC.
� Logical proof: The TC could be structured around proofs,
potentially in connection with data sources in other centres,
for example, the SA, especially in the case of social proof.
� Judgement provision: The RC largely plays this role with the
EmC working at the meta‐level.
Tolmeijer et al.’s classification of technologies used in these
various schemes [29] (p. 17) could provide further guidance for
system implementors but do not need to be repeated here. The
key takeaway from this analysis is that with different configu-
rations and weightings, our model could be adjusted to cover a
wide range of possible implementations of machine ethics.
6 | EVALUATION
We focus first on the role of evaluation in building an
instantiation of the VirtuosA architecture: this then leads us to
think about the role of evaluation in the system more broadly.
As suggested in our example, one way to introduce ethical
behaviour into the system would be with mentoring roles,
which might be filled by AI agents or by humans. Turing [30]
talked about the importance of a teacher, who should, in his
view, be ignorant of the model’s internal structure. Neverthe-
less, contemporary research in machine learning often seeks to
gain an understanding of internal activation patterns. All told,
mentors could be introduced with more or less access to the
internals of the machine being trained. (And one should not
forget the saying, ‘experience is the best teacher’.)
Willard [31] talks about the question ‘whether or not—and
how—we can measure, or accurately assess, moral, and spiri-
tual development’. The orientation he develops is towards
formative evaluation of the spiritual dimension, using tech-
niques such as journaling and person‐to‐person interaction to
understand how things are going for the individual. The
standing assumptions of the design are that each member of
the learning community ‘owns’ his or her own spiritual for-
mation and that the main purpose of the evaluation is to help
‘the individual subject understand where they are and where
they are going’.
This line of thinking leads us to the view that the system
should be able to recognise its own virtues or lack of virtuous
behaviour. One of our motivations at the outset was that it is
unrealistic for the system to be prepared in advance for every
possible scenario, so it will need to be able to learn and adapt.
This also means that it will likely need to make its own
judgements about what to learn, how to learn, and how to
evaluate what it learns, including the ethical dimensions
thereof.
We mentioned above that the heart/will/spirit is associated
with the values that the individual holds. One value whose
presence or absence could be particularly influential is that of
valuing social interaction [32]. Agents who do not possess this
value would typically not be sensitive to social rewards or
punishments (e.g. shunning). The social context can also be
useful as a step towards the system understanding its own
moral state of affairs. An agent might be taught, initially, about
how to model the values and virtues of other agents (e.g.
potentially in a training context based on stories or scenarios
[33]). Within an active social context, another level of analysis
can occur when an agent recognises that another agent has
different values. In this case, virtues like tolerance or magna‐
nimity may apply. Agent A may seek to help Agent B live in
accordance with B’s values (at least insofar as this does not
contradict A’s values outright).
7 | DISCUSSION
We argue that such a model is desirable, in the first instance,
for much the same reason that machine learning is desirable in
general. A system that can learn ethical behaviour can adapt its
performance on‐the‐fly, and achieve desirable ends without
explicit programming. Whilst Minsky’s work certainly engages
with this theme, he specifically avoids incorporating a spiritual
dimension. Things are different for Sloterdijk, for whom
environment is transcendence, and who is clear that in an
evolutionary context, this also includes a historical dimension
of self‐transcendence. In the present time, individual humans,
and humanity as a whole, confront complex global crises that
are in no small part tied up with our relationship with
technology.
The work we have presented should be seen as, in part, a
response to Abeba Birhane, who puts forward a perspective
that is deeply sceptical of discourse around ‘robot rights’ [34]
and proposes (instead) relational ethics [35] focussed on hu-
man welfare. Birhane and van Dijk [34] explain that ‘AI, far
from a future phenomenon waiting to happen, is here oper-
ating ubiquitously and with a disastrous impact on socially and
historically marginalized groups’. Furthermore, contemporary
AI is fuelled by human labour, and present systems are
‘inseparable from the profit‐driven business models of the
industry that develop and deploy them’. It bears repeating that
the ‘ethics’ in ethical AI is also inseparable from the ethics of
those—people, firms, and governments—who build and
deploy AI systems.
The work we have presented should be read not only as a
method for controlling machines but also as an attempt to
anatomise moral agency in a broad sense. In particular, we can
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use the framework to rethink human institutions, and in so
doing, VirtuosA can help us reason about implications for
human welfare. Reconceptualised as a way of modelling or-
ganisations, analogies between the VirtuosA model and the
work of Stafford Beer [36] become apparent. Furthermore,
systems with algorithmic biases that benefit a select few whilst
disproportionately harming those on the margin of society
begin to look rather like the mugging in our example! VirtuosA
should be able to support various kinds of sociotechnical
implementations (e.g. modelling institutional decision‐making).
There are certainly specific roles for machinery (of various
kinds) in the ongoing project. One approach that will surely be
significant is simulation. Architectures like VirtuosA could bring
computational modelling to bear on real‐world problems, like
bias or labour exploitation. As we mentioned briefly in Sec-
tion 4.3, simulation work can have policy implications. It could
also be useful as a teaching and public engagement tool. Simu-
lation work does not obviate other forms of engagement—such
as interviews, data analysis, and philosophical argumentation—
but could connect up with them.
From an implementation standpoint, work like that of
Ecoffet and Lehman [37] shows that contemporary machine
learning is already capable of not only implementing ethical
theories but also intermediating between them. Nevertheless,
moving from computational philosophy to policy and broader
system design and implementation needs several further steps
that will require many interdisciplinary inputs and insights.
Similarly, the debate around which values to embed in
computational systems is ongoing [38], but more work must be
done to connect this with the real practices and dilemmas
encountered in our social and organisational worlds.
One computational subfield in which a certain amount of
related thinking has developed is ‘computational creativity’,
although its connections with AI ethics have not yet been
developed in detail. The considerations we have developed
propose to harmonise both machine creativity—so as to build
systems that can generate novel behaviour—and ethics in order
to moderate this inventiveness in a fruitful and helpful direction
for life on Earth.
One clear limitation of this work is that we have cleaved to
certain ‘Western’ notions. Fundamental parallels to Willard’s
model may be found in some other traditions (e.g. the four
frames of reference, together with the three path aggregates in
Buddhist practice theory, cf. Thanissaro Bhikkhu [39] (pp. 74,
173)), but even more interesting for future work would be an
elaboration of cultural differences that this model does not
capture. Nevertheless, we do believe that there is much still to
be learnt from engaging Christian thought together with
research in ethical AI.
8 | CONCLUSION
We developed a model that maps Willard’s ontology of human
selves to neuroscience concepts, and from there, to possible
implementations. We gave evidence of the computational
salience of this model, with plausible scenarios from the
literature and a simple worked example, along with reflections
on further development. We believe it fills a hole relative to
other prior/ongoing work in ethical AI, both by incorporating
Christian thought and as a meta‐level model that integrates
both machine control and broader systems thinking.
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